


A dark blue, irregularly shaped graphic with a splatter effect, containing white text. The graphic is centered on a white background and has a rough, ink-like border with small blue droplets scattered around it. The text is white and centered within the blue shape.

# Further Fact and Hybrid Theories

The image features a large, dark, textured shape on the left side, resembling a splash or a piece of dark material. The rest of the background is white with scattered dark specks and faint, light-colored patterns. The text "Further Fact Theories" is written in a white, sans-serif font over the dark shape.

# Further Fact Theories

# Further fact view

- Psychological and physical theories are **reductionist theories**.
- They reduce facts about the persistence of personal identity to psychological and physical facts.
- A **non-reductionist approach** to personal identity would claim that what it means to be a person or what makes a person the same person over time *cannot be reduced to other facts*.
- Instead, **there is a fact over and above** psychological and physical facts that accounts for whether someone is a person or whether we are talking about the same person over time.

The general idea of the non-reductionist is that there are facts / phenomena / realities that are neither

1. psychological, nor
2. physical

And these facts / phenomena / realities can

Explain what it means for B at t2 to be the same person as A at t1.


# Further fact view

**Further fact approaches** avoid the reduction of the personal identity facts to psychological or physical facts.



Facts of personal identity

**Psychological approaches** reduce facts about personal identity to psychological facts



Facts of personal identity



Psychological facts

**Physical approaches** reduce facts about personal identity to physical facts



Facts of personal identity



Physical facts

# Further fact view

**Further fact theory** -- there is some further fact that is not reducible to physical or psychological facts that accounts for A being a person and/or for A at t1 and B at t2 being the same people.

# Further fact view

There are a couple reasons we might accept the further fact view:

1. it can account for strict, numerical identity of personhood over time
2. it can account for the egoistic concern.
3. Physical and psychological approaches are problematic (see objections in slides)

# Further fact view

## Reason 1: Strict identity

- Psychological and physical theories tend to say that you are the **same person** but "same" is used in an unclear way
- "Sameness" is not qualitatively identical and "sameness" is not strict identity
- In both the psychological and physical theories, you **change** over time but you somehow stay the same person.

**Leibniz's law:** two objects  $x$  and  $y$  are identical to each other ( $x=y$ ) if and only if  $x$  and  $y$  have the same properties.

- For both psychological and physical theories, A and B have different properties so they are not identical
- All talk by personal identity theorists of persons being one and the same person over time is not (strictly speaking) accurate.

**Insight:** if there is some non-physical, non-psychological and **unchanging fact** about an individual then such a theory could accommodate the view that Tek at t1 is one and the same person (in the strict sense) to Tek at t2.



Some unchanging (non-psychological and non-physical) fact makes us the same person.

A further fact theory that posited an unchanging thing could then account for strict identity over time.

## Reason 2: Egoistic Concern

- Each of us has a **unique care for our future selves**.
- We care for others, but we have a distinctive concern for what happens to us on a future date
- **Egoistic concern:** the unique concern we have for our own future self

**Example 1:** Suppose I know there is an afterlife. I am concerned about whether others go to this afterlife, but I also have a separate concern that I am one of those people (this is my egoistic concern)



**Example 2:** I may be concerned about my fellow classmates. I hope they do well on their upcoming metaphysics exam. But I also have a distinct concern that **I do well** on the upcoming metaphysics exam. This second concern is an egoistic concern.

## Argument from Egoistic Concern

P1: It is both natural and rational to have an egoistic concern.

P2: Our egoistic concern is not about someone that is psychologically and physically **connected** to us. It is a concern about our avoiding harm or acquiring good.

C: Therefore, neither the psychological nor the physical approaches to personal identity can account for the **rational** and **natural** basis for the egoistic concern.



# Objections to further fact theories

**Objection - There is no clear explanation about the nature of this “further fact” that stands above and beyond psychological and physical facts.**

Suppose we assume that the further fact above and beyond the psychological and physical facts is *having the same non-physical soul*. If this is the case, then such a view faces a variety of different objections.

- O1: Controversial evidence and arguments for the existence of souls
- O2: Implausible consequences result from positing the existence of souls (see next slide)

## Objection – Implausible Consequences from the idea of the soul

- If a soul exists, it exists independent of the body
- It is thus possible that the following **implausible consequences result**: (1) two persons could share the same soul and (2) a single person might have multiple souls

Case 1: Suppose A dies and soul-A enters a new body (body-B). Now soul-A-body-B is the same person as A even though there is no psychological-or-physical relation. This is implausible.

Case 2: Suppose A is awake and while has soul-A and while sleeping takes on soul-B. So, A is not the same person while asleep. Implausible.

O1: Two persons could share the same soul

- Case 1: Suppose A dies and soul-A enters a new body (body-B). Now soul-A-body-B is the same person as A even though **there is no psychological-or-physical relation**. This is possible from the theory but completely implausible.

O2: a single person might have multiple souls

- Case 2: Suppose A is awake and while A is awake, A has soul-A
- But while sleeping, A takes on soul-B.
- So, A is not the same person while asleep. Implausible.



# Hybrid theories

# Hybrid theories

Sometimes people think that the best theory is either a **combination** of all the theories or the **middle ground** between two theories

- Some attractiveness to this idea since we identify ourselves with our psychology (memories, beliefs, character traits, etc.) but also
- acknowledge the **important relation our bodies** play in determining our psychology.

# Hybrid theories

- P1: Physicalist approaches make persistence consist almost entirely of an individual retaining physical properties.
- P2: Psychological approaches make persistence consist almost entirely of an individual retaining psychological properties
- P3: Neither theory is fully convincing.
- C: Therefore, the right theory must involve both physical and psychological properties

# Hybrid theories

There are several problems with any type of hybrid theory

1. Some appear to commit the golden mean fallacy
2. They can take on new problems that neither independent theory had
3. They can inherit the problems of the independent theory
4. Theories are smashed together without any explanation of how they work together

# Hybrid theories

## Problem 1: Commits golden mean fallacy

The **golden mean fallacy** is a type of fallacy where the moderateness of a position **M** is assumed to count as evidence for (or is a reason in support of) **M** being true.

### Example

- P1: Banning all recreational drugs is an extreme position.
- P2: Legalizing all recreational drugs is an extreme position.
- P3: A more moderate position is to legalize some drugs and keep others illegal.
- C: Therefore, the correct course of action is to legalize some drugs and keep others illegal.

**There is nothing about the moderateness of a position that makes it true!**

# Hybrid theories

**Problem 2: A hybrid theory might have problems that neither position (on their own) has**

- P1: Banning all recreational drugs is an extreme position.
- P2: Legalizing all recreational drugs is an extreme position.
- P3: A more moderate position is to legalize some drugs and keep others illegal.
- C: Therefore, the correct course of action is to legalize some drugs and keep others illegal.

When all drugs are banned or legal, there isn't the problem of deciding which drugs are acceptable and which drugs are not acceptable (this is a new problem that the moderate position takes on)

# Hybrid theories

Problem 3: The hybrid theory can simply inherit the problems that infected **both** sides

- One problem with banning all drugs is that it **restricts liberty**. This is still a problem for the more moderate position
- One problem with keeping all drugs legal is that it gives the impression that **society condones drug use**. This is still a problem for the more moderate position

# Hybrid theories

**Problem 4: Theories are smashed together without any account of how they are supposed to work together**

- Simply saying that you will ban some drugs and legalize others doesn't specify criteria that:
  - Determines which drugs to ban
  - Determines which drugs to permit

# Hybrid theories

None of this is to say that

1. A hybrid theory is false
2. Hybrid theories are implausible

Instead, what is being asserted is that:

1. Putting two theories together does not antecedently give it any credibility



Two hybrid  
theories of  
personal  
identity

# Two hybrid theories

There are two hybrid theories:

1. **Conjunctive** psycho-physical theory of personal identity
2. **Disjunctive** psycho-physical theory of personal identity

# Two hybrid theories

**Conjunctive psycho-physical theory of personal identity** - If A is a person at t1 and B a person at t2, then  $A = B$  iff there is **psychological AND physical connectedness** between B and A.

# Two hybrid theories

- The conjunctive theory faces problems that the psychological and physical theories face independently.
- **Objection: upload and teletransportation.** Identities would not be preserved were we to transport/upload our psychology since there is no physical connectedness.
- **Objection: fetus problem.** If the conjunctive theory is true, then we were never a fetus since there is no psychological connectedness
- **Objection: medical cases.** If the conjunctive theory is true, then we cease to persist in the medical cases (Alzheimer's, coma, vegetative state)

# Two hybrid theories

**Disjunctive psycho-physical theory of personal identity (DT)** - if A is a person at t1 and B a person at t2, then  $A = B$  iff there is **psychological OR physical connectedness** between B and A.

# Two hybrid theories

The disjunctive theory faces a problem that a new problem that didn't impact either theory. Leads to **contradiction** in cases of psychology swapping.

# Two hybrid theories

- Suppose we can modify Tek's brain to create Liz's psychology
  - And modify Liz's brain to create Tek's psychology:
- 
- According to DT, Tek is BOTH:
    1. Liz-brain-w-Tek-psychology (psychological connectedness)
    2. Tek-brain-w-Liz-psychology (physical connectedness)
  - BUT ALSO according to DT, Liz is:
    1. Liz-brain-w-Tek-psychology (physical connectedness)
    2. ek-brain-w-Liz-psychology (psychological connectedness)

# Extra Credit Point

- We have considered (roughly) some theories of diachronic personal identity:
- What is the solution to the diachronic theory of personal identity?
- State your theory and give one reason in support of your position.

Point will go to your RAP1 assignment.

